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Abstract: We consider the problem of ranking sets of alternatives. Standard approaches to this
problem regard the addition of an alternative to a set containing one element as enhancing choice.
We argue that this monotonicity axiom may not be desirable when an agent is uncertain as to the
value of this additional alternative. We replace monotonicity with an uncertainty aversion axiom,
and also introduce an axiom that produces lexicographic behaviour. These axioms, in conjunction
with an independence axiom, enable us to prove a characterisation theorem. This theorem says
that sets are ranked in terms of the number of uncertain elements that they contain, the fewer
the better. This is the only ranking rule that satisfies our axioms.
I INTRODUCTION
E
conomics assumes that individuals have preferences over the elements in
a given set of alternatives. Individuals are not required to have
preferences over subsets of this set. Of course, the ranking of elements in the
superset can induce a ranking of subsets. If the superset is denoted by X, then
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preferred element in A is preferred to the most preferred element in B. This is
the indirect utility approach to ranking subsets.
We can think of subsets as alternative “menus” from which an individual
must make a choice. Imagine you prefer steak to all other food. According to
the indirect utility approach this means that you would prefer the menu
(steak) to the menu (monkfish, lamb, risotto, salad).  However, this menu gives
you no freedom to choose whatsoever; the only choice open to you is to eat
steak. The second menu offers more choice, and we would expect individuals
to attach some value to this when ranking menus. This is a weakness with the
indirect utility approach.
An alternative approach has emerged in which subsets are ranked directly
in terms of how much choice they offer an economic agent. The subsets in this
literature are called opportunity sets presumably because you have the
opportunity to consume anything in the set. The seminal paper by Pattanaik
and Xu in 1990 is one of the first axiomatic treatments of this problem. They
impose three axioms on the ranking of opportunity sets and demonstrate that
these are uniquely satisfied by the cardinality rule. This rule says that
opportunity sets are ranked according to the number of elements they contain;
the larger the set the more choice it affords. So (monkfish, lamb, risotto, salad)
would be ranked above (steak) according to this rule. Their first axiom,
Indifference between No-Choice Situations, says that any two singleton sets
always generate an equal amount of choice. Their second axiom, Monotonicity
(MON), says that any set containing two elements provides more choice than
any of its elements. Their third axiom, Independence (IND), says that the
ranking of any two opportunity sets A and B is preserved if an element x which
is neither in A nor in B is added to them. It turns out that these three axioms
(plus transitivity) produce the very surprising result that opportunity sets are
ranked according to the cardinality rule and no other rule.
The axiomatic approach has been developed in the literature (see Klemish-
Ahlert (1993), Pattanaik and Xu (2000), van Hees (2004), Peragine and
Romero-Medina (2006) to name just a few). Sen (1990, 1991, 1993) famously
attacked this approach for its neglect of underlying preferences in assessing
the value of an opportunity set. His critique of INS and MON is based on this.
Sen’s influential attack has produced an enormous number of responses (see
Arrow (1995); Gravel (1994); Puppe (1996, 1998); Pattanaik and Xu (1998);
Sugden (1998); Nehring and Puppe (1999); Romero-Medina (2001); Bavetta
and Peragine (2006), for a more complete list of references we refer to Barbera,
Bossert and Pattanaik’s (2004) survey). Despite Sen’s critique of MON, most
of the literature continues to use it as an axiom, albeit in some modified form.
The MON axiom seems reasonable if the point of the exercise is to rank
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are interested in an agent’s evaluation of an opportunity set then a larger set
need not be better. Of course, we can already see this from the perspective of
indirect utility. The point we wish to make in this paper, however, is that
larger sets need not be better even without appealing to indirect utility. This
is our central contribution.
To motivate our approach, imagine that an agent has incomplete
information about some elements in the opportunity set. For example, suppose
that the agent has never eaten monkfish and so has no idea how it compares
with the other food on the menu. Ordinarily this would not matter; the agent
could just select one of the remaining foods ignoring the presence of the
monkfish. In fact, when evaluating the set (monkfish, lamb, risotto, salad) the
agent could regard it as equivalent to (lamb, risotto, salad). However, suppose
that the actual choice is determined for the agent at random. More precisely,
assume that each element on the menu can be chosen with some probability,
but the agent is unaware as to what this probability is (in the literature, this
is called an environment of complete uncertainty). All the agent knows is that
these probabilities must sum to one. In an environment like this, it is possible
to formulate an axiom called Uncertainty Aversion (UA). This axiom says 
that an uncertainty averse individual will be made worse off, other things
equal, if an alternative about which she is uncertain is added to the
opportunity set.
Here is another example. In theories of distributive justice extensive use
is made of a device called the “original position”. This is a hypothetical
situation in which people compare different social states from behind a veil of
ignorance. From behind the veil an individual can observe the effects of
different social states on different people. For example, if everyone is better off
in one state than in another then presumably the observer would place this
state above the other in her ranking. What makes the observer’s preferences
impartial is that she does not know which individual in society she will be
should that state of the world actually arise. In the language of our theory, the
probability distribution across possible people is unknown to the observer.
This, it is argued, gives the observer an incentive to assess the social states
from an impartial point of view. It is easy to translate this into our setting. An
individual behind the veil would observe a set of possible lives. As social states
vary so would this set; individual characteristics vary across states. But, as
states vary, so can the size of the population. In some states there may be more
people than in others. Imagine that an additional person is added to a state,
other things equal. Moreover, imagine that this person’s characteristics in 
this state are hard for the observer to compare with everyone else’s
characteristics. In other words, the observer cannot tell whether this life is
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seems reasonable to assume a form of uncertainty aversion. In this context,
our axiom says that an uncertainty averse observer would be made worse off,
other things equal, if a life about which she is uncertain is added to the set of
possible lives.
We show that it is possible to express the concept of uncertainty aversion
in a purely set-theoretic setting. Using an axiomatic approach reminiscent of
that of Pattanaik and Xu, we characterise an extreme form of behaviour called
lexicographic uncertainty aversion. This is a rule that ranks opportunity sets
according to the number of uncertain elements that they contain, the fewer the
better. This means that the number of uncertain elements lexically dominates
the number of certain elements, and so the size of the opportunity set itself is
irrelevant. This rule is the only rule that satisfies our axioms. Bossert (2000)
and Gekker and van Hees (2006) are the only other papers we are aware of
that consider information issues when ranking opportunity sets.
Section II introduces the framework and Section III presents the results.
We conclude with some brief remarks in Section IV. 
II THE  FRAMEWORK
Let X denote a non-empty finite set of alternatives. Let Π(X) denote the set
of all non-empty subsets of X. The elements of Π(X) are called opportunity sets
and are denoted by A, B, C, … . We assume that an agent is uncertain about
some of the elements in X. We denote by X* the non-empty set of uncertain
elements, where X* is not equal to X. Let Π(X*) denote the set of all non-empty
subsets of X*.
Following van Hees (1998), we are interested in ranking opportunity
situations. An opportunity situation is an ordered pair of sets (A, E) ∈Π (X) ×
Π(X*) where E ⊆ A. Let T denote the set of all opportunity situations. The
interpretation is the following: the agent is faced with the opportunity set A
whilst being uncertain (or ignorant) about the elements in E. To illustrate this
concept, in our original example the individual’s opportunity situation is
(monkfish, lamb, risotto, salad), (monkfish).
Let   be a reflexive and transitive binary relation on T. In this extended
framework, (A, E)   (B, F) should be read as “facing the opportunity set A
whilst being uncertain about the elements in E is weakly preferred to facing
the opportunity set B whilst being uncertain about the elements in F”. As
usual we denote by   and    the asymmetric and symmetric factors of  
respectively.
We now introduce the following axioms.
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(A, {x})   (B, {y}).
This is an extremely strong axiom and it may be considered intuitively
unattractive. IUS says that situations in which two opportunity sets contain
one uncertain element each are regarded as indifferent. In other words, no
weight is given to the number of certain elements in an opportunity set when
comparing two sets, both of which contain just one uncertain element. This
axiom could plausibly describe the behaviour of an extreme uncertainty
averter.
Note that this axiom says nothing about how sets containing more than
one uncertain element are ranked. Moreover, it says nothing about how sets
containing more than one uncertain element are ranked against sets
containing one uncertain element.
Independence (IND): For all (A, E), (B, F) ∈ T, and all x ∉ A and y ∉ B,
(A, E)   (B, F) ⇔ (A  {x}, E  {x})   (B  {y}, F  {y}).
IND says that adding new, uncertain elements to a pair of opportunity
situations preserves their ranking.
We now introduce our uncertainty aversion axiom. 
Uncertainty Aversion (UA): For all (A, E) ∈ T and for all x ∈ X* such that 
x ∉ A, (A, E)   (A  {x}, E  {x}).
UA simply says that an agent who is uncertainty averse will be made
worse off, other things equal, by the addition of an uncertain alternative to her
opportunity situation.
We use these three axioms to characterise a rule for ranking finite
opportunity situations in terms of the number of uncertain elements that they
contain. This lexicographic uncertainty ordering  U on T is defined as follows:
For all (A, E), (B, F) ∈ T, (A, E)  U (B, F) ⇔ |A ∩ E| ≤ |B ∩ F|.
III THEOREM
Theorem.   satisfies IUS, IND and UA if and only if   =  U.
Proof:
We first prove (⇐).
Assume that   =  U but that   does not satisfy IUS. Therefore, there exists
an (A, {x}), (B, {y}) ∈ T such that  (A, {x})   (B, {y}). But then it is false that
|A ∩ {x}| ≤ |B ∩ {y}| which is a contradiction.
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exists (A, E), (B, F) ∈ T with x ∉ A and y ∉ B, such that (A, E)   (B, F) and
 (A  {x}, E  {x})   (B  {y}, F  {y}). But then it is false that |{A  {x}} 
{E  {x}| ≤ |{B  {y}}  {F  {y}}|. However, this contradicts the fact that 
|A  E| ≤ |B  F|.
Assume that    =  U but that    does not satisfy UA. Therefore, there
exists (A, E) ∈ T and an x ∈ X* such that x ∉ A and  (A, E)   (A  {x}, 
E  {x}). But then it is false that |A  E| ≤ |{A  {x}}  {E  {x}}| which
contradicts the fact that x ∉ A.
We now prove (⇒). 
Suppose that   satisfies IUS, IND and UA. Since  U is complete, it is
sufficient to prove that for all (A, E), (B, F) ∈ T,
|A  E| = |B  F| ⇒ (A, E)   (B, F) (1)
and
|A  E| < |B  F| ⇒ (A, E)   (B, F) (2)
We prove (1) by induction on the number of elements in A  E and in 
B  F. If |A  E| = |B  F| = 1 then (A, E)   (B, F) by IUS. Now suppose
that (1) is true for all (A, E), (B, F) such that |A  E| = |B  F| = n. We want
to establish (1) for all (A', E'), (B', F') such that |A'  E'| = |B'  F'| = n + 1.
Let E  E' with |E'| = n + 1. Therefore, there exists an x = E' – E.
We examine two cases:
(i) x ∈ {B'  F'}. Let B = B' – {x} and F = F' – {x}.
Let A* be an arbitrary set such that E  A* and x  A*. By the inductive
hypothesis we have (A*, E)   (B, F). Independence implies that (A*  {x}, 
E  {x})   (B  {x}, F  {x}) which is what we wanted to prove.
(ii) x  {B'  F'}. Since |A'  E'| = |B'  F'| and E'  A' and F'  B' we 
have |E'| = |F'|. Since x ∈ E' but x  F' then there exists y ∈ F' – E'. Let 
F = F' – {y} and let B* be an arbitrary set such that F  B* and y  B*. 
By construction |B*  F| = n and so the inductive hypothesis implies that
(A*, E)   (B*, F). Independence implies that (A*  {x}, E  {x})   (B*  {y}, 
F  {y}) which is what we wanted to prove.
We now prove (2).
Let (A, E), (B, F) ∈ T be such that |A  E| < |B  F|. Let (B**, F*) be an
opportunity situation with |B**  F*| = |A  E|. Moreover, F*  F with 
B** = B – {F – F*}. By (1) we have (A, E)   (B**, F*). Repeated application of
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Transitivity implies that (A, E)   (B, F).
IV CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have assumed that an individual is uncertain about some
options in her opportunity set and have proposed a set-theoretic definition of
uncertainty aversion. Using an approach reminiscent of that of Pattanaik and
Xu, we proposed a set of axioms that characterise what we call lexicographic
uncertainty aversion. This is a rule that ranks opportunity sets according to
the number of uncertain elements that they contain, the fewer the better. This
means that the number of uncertain elements lexically dominates the number
of certain elements, and so the size of the opportunity set itself is irrelevant.
Perhaps it should be noted that we do not take into account various
degrees of uncertainty that could be measured in a more sophisticated
approach. We postpone this consideration until the next occasion.
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